Disentangling violence after conflict: The case of Guatemala in a sub national analysis

Katherine Aguirre

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Disentangling violence after conflict: The case of Guatemala in a sub national analysis

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Abstract
This article conceptualizes violence after the conflict, develop its definition, explanatory factors and typology. A central consideration of this analysis is that there are different levels of relationship between conflict and post-conflict violence, with some forms of violence completely related, other partially related and other completely independent of the conflict. While general aspects of the conditions of peace (i.e., political and economic instability) defines post-conflict violence in a weak sense, direct legacies of the war define post-conflict violence in a strong sense. The case analysis of Guatemala allows to identify patterns and factors related to each form of violence, in a sub national analysis.

Key words: post-conflict violence, conflict termination, conditions of peace, legacies of war, Guatemala

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1. Introduction

Possible violence upsurge after a negotiated settlement is a central issue within post-conflict stability discussions. In these contexts, post-conflict violence can refer to the risk of conflict relapse or conflict long-lasting effects. In any case, the term ‘post-conflict violence’ is used indiscriminately to refer to any type of violence that occur after conflict termination.

Nevertheless, there is not a unique case of ‘post-conflict violence’. In fact, depending on the national –even regional– context, violence that occurs after conflict termination could be a relapse of the conflict, partially related with the conflict as such or completely independent.

This research aims to provide a better understanding on the different dynamics of violence after the termination of a conflict. It also seeks to illustrate how this violence can be related to conflict and conflict termination at different levels, presenting a range of its possible manifestations (a typology of violence). Considering this conceptual framework, Guatemala is used as a case study.

War-to-peace transitions and possible violence upsurges are a prolific area of interests in academic research. Nevertheless, analysing what has been called ‘post-conflict violence’, poses many conceptual challenges, resulting from not considering that violence after the conflict can take many forms. These conceptual shortcomings includes the post-conflict violence definition, it origins, when it finish, the explanatory factors and cross-country comparisons, among others.

This research starts with a comprehensive definition of ‘post-conflict violence’, based on the level of relationship between conflict-related violence with the conflict as such. Post-conflict violence is here framed as conflict-partially-related violence, rather conflict-totally-related violence (i.e. conflict relapse) or violence completely independent from wartime.

Following, this research will be focused on all possible post-conflict violence settings. Depending on the context, post-conflict violence can be related in a strong or a weak sense to the conflict. This level of relationship is defined by the factors relating conflict and violence after conflict. There are some factors that could explain, in general terms, the existence and reproduction of all forms of violence after the conflict, i.e. general conditions of political and economic instability (conditions of peace) defining post-conflict violence in a weak sense. Other set of explanations are directly related to the legacies of the war, defining post-conflict violence in a strong sense. In this document, an overview on violence after conflict termination shows that manifestations of violence could be shaped differently. In this research, eight types of violence are identified.

To determine at what extent each type of violence is conflict-related –in a strong or a weak sense- it is required a deep analysis of a case-by-case post-conflict setting. Post-conflict violence is not evenly distributed across the country. This complexity reveals that factors could be hardly disentangled at the national level, justifying sub-national research based on quantitative and qualitative information analysis. Guatemala is a useful case for this type of analysis: violence peaked after the peace accord in 1996.

Recent studies on contemporary violence in Guatemala has linked post-conflict violence to the previous conflict by the continuity and strengthening of clandestine groups, together with the widespread situation of impunity and corruption left after the conflict. This research aims to provide a broader overview of all types of violence that shaped violence in all regions of Guatemala.

Guatemala case-study is based on a ‘regionalization of post-conflict violence’. When focusing in a specific type of violence in a region it is possible to identify patterns and factors related to each form of violence, distinguishing those that are directly associated to legacies of the war, conditions of peace or, factors independent from the conflict. The analysis is based in a combination of different methodologies, includes qualitative and quantitative analysis of violence indicators, which has also benefited from interviews of local experts in Guatemala.

This document has five chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter presents the post-conflict violence conceptual framework. Next chapter introduces the case of Guatemala, with review on the evolution of violence in the country. Fourth chapter aims to elaborate the primary objective of this research: the regionalization of violence in post-conflict Guatemala, its characteristics, explanations and levels of relationship with the conflict period. With this inputs, the final section concludes.
2. Post-conflict violence: concepts and cases

The term ‘post-conflict violence’ is widely understood as the violence taking place after a formal termination of a conflict. Indiscriminately used, this term could refer to all different types of violence after the termination of a conflict, including the continuation of conflict violence, and forms of violence that are minimally related to the conflict. These two extreme cases define a spectrum of the violence after the conflict termination: from violence entirely, partially, or minimally related to armed conflict.

The academic literature highlighting the shortcomings of the definition of post-conflict violence is extensive and notes the limits given by the definition post-conflict violence. (Surhike, 2012; Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012; Small Arms Survey, 2009; Geneva Declaration, 2008; Lambarch, 2007).

The end of a conflict doesn’t imply that actors, motivations, and violent mechanisms are independent, new, or completely transformed in relation to the conflict. Violence “is endogenous to civil wars, and political actors use violence to achieve multiple, overlapping and sometimes mutually contradictory goals” (Kalyvas, 2006; p. 23).

Violence have multiple purposes, serving different individual, organizational, and ideological motivations as illustrated by the case of piracy and conflict in Somalia, illicit drugs and armed conflict in Afghanistan, and violence against women used with political ends in Iraq (Stepanova, 2010; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011; Green and Wald, 2009).

As presented in Figure 1 post-conflict violence take place after the conflict termination, but not necessarily all violence after the conflict is post-conflict violence. In the same way, forms of violence that are a continuation of conflict violence, or completely independent from the conflict (at any moment) are excluded from the post-conflict concept. Post-conflict violence refers only to the cases when violence is partially related with the conflict, relation that can be in ‘a strong’ or ‘a weak’ sense depending on the level of its relationship with actors, factors of conflict, and the conflict termination.

![Figure 1. The spectrum of violence after the conflict termination and post-conflict violence](image)

2.1.1 Violence entirely related or completely independent of the conflict: no post-conflict violence

Kalyvas (2006) defines civil war as “an armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (p. 17). Accordingly with this definition the aspect that differentiates civil war from post-conflict is the absence of a monopoly of violence by the state and the challenge for sovereignty.

Following Kalyvas’ argumentation, there is a distinction between civil war and violence in civil war, therefore “the causes of violence in civil war cannot be subsumed under the causes of civil war” (p. 20). As an analogy, it could be stated that “when a conflict ends, conflict violence not necessarily ends”, then all violence in the post-conflict period is not necessarily post-conflict violence.

In some cases, after the conflict termination, violence is still related to a challenge of sovereignty. In these cases, ‘oligopolies of violence’ remain active, challenging sovereignty. After the conflict termination “the state is frequently unable to fulfil its mandate to exercise a legitimate monopoly over the means of physical coercion. As a result, alternative security-providers enter into the ‘security market’ where the state is unable or unwilling to provide security as a public good” (Lambarch, 2007; p. 7). When spoilers are able to achieve their objective, the situation is a conflict relapse. In other cases, violence can be used to shape conditions in the negotiations (Darby, 2001; Stedman, 1997: 1)
At the end of the spectrum, there are exceptional cases when violence is completely unrelated with the conflict. These cases depend on the full recovery, economic and political stability, then being fully independent of the conditions of peace.

2.1.2 Violence partially related to the conflict: post-conflict violence in a strong and weak sense

Following Figure 1, post-conflict violence occurs exclusively when it is not completely, but partially, related to the conflict. Depending on each context, post-conflict violence could have a strong or a weak relationship with the conflict, and as explained here, related with the conditions of peace or with the legacies of the war.

Post-conflict violence in a weak sense

There are some factors that could explain in general terms, the existence and reproduction of all forms of violence after the conflict, as well as violence during the conflict and even violence in non-conflict contexts. These factors are associated to the general conditions of political and economic instability (conditions of peace) understood here as forms of post-conflict violence in a weak sense.

Conditions of peace includes the absence of rule of law, general political and economic instability, and institutional breakdown, characteristics of the post conflict context. The World Development Report of 2012 highlights that “the failure to develop legitimate, capable, and accountable institutions cause repeated cycles of violence” (World Bank, 2011: 3).

The extreme case of violence fully explained by the absence of rule of law and economic instability could be a ‘failed state’. In contrast, with a strong rule of law and economic stability after the conflict, will have forms of violence minimally related to conflict. Among the factors explaining post-conflict violence in a weak sense are:

- Low institutional capacity: public institutional low capacity to deliver justice (widespread impunity) and the lack of law enforcement (coercive capacity of the state) will impose low constrains on individuals to engage in violent activities after the conflict (Richiani, 2007).
- Active abuse and lack of institutional accountability: includes the relationships among state security organizations and government agents to generating corruption, and complicity with criminal actors; “societies that rely on elite pacts, coercion and patronage to control violence risk repeating a vicious cycle” (World Bank, 2011: 88).
- Economic and social instability: the existence of a dual relationship of economic factors and conflict is the main argument of the ‘conflict trap’ presented in of Collier et. al (2003).

Post-conflict violence in a strong sense

Refers to the forms of violence after the conflict than can be explained by direct legacies of the conflict. Below a not comprehensive list of the factors related with the legacies of the conflict, explaining post-conflict violence in a strong sense

- Balance of power: warring actors –state and non-state, can exert selective political violence either to consolidate victory and political power or to obstruct the implementation of the provisions of the negotiated settlements (Suhrke, 2011)
- Massive dissatisfaction resulting from the negotiated settlements: can encourage forms of violent civil unrest and likely an overly violent reply from state security forces.
- Return of displaced populations: provide opportunities to seek revenge, to settle old grievances, and to promote large-scale urban migration exacerbating the risks factors of urban violence.
- Limited DDR: demobilized (mainly young male) combatants could be involved in criminal acts either as individuals, by joining existing groups, or forming new ones.
- Limited SSR and DDR: could increase the availability of weapons which can be used by groups and individuals.
- ‘Culture of violence’: resulting from the high exposure to violence during the conflict could make actors such as former combatants, victims, and common people familiarized with violence.

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2 The terms of ‘conditions of peace’ and ‘legacies of war’ are taken from Suhrke (2012): “war-to-peace transitions may be particularly vulnerable to social violence for reasons that are generally seen to fall into two categories: legacies of war and conditions to peace” (p. 2). The author doesn’t provide a classification of factors in these categories.
Absence of reconciliation and reparation to the victims: could intensify unresolved political and ethnic tensions in the post-conflict context.

2.2 A typology of violence after the conflict termination and related factors

This section presents a typology of violence after the conflict termination. This typology is useful to disentangle the explanatory factors of such manifestations of violence. This classification don’t entail a temporal succession of events or a ranking of types of violence, the types of violence that are not mutually exclusive and can occur at the same time in a single country. Also, these forms of violence can also exist at different temporal stages, appearing or disappearing over time.

a) State-led political violence

As a result of the balance of power after negotiated settlements, state actors can exert political violence either to consolidate victory, or to obstruct the implementation of the provisions of the negotiated settlements.

Spain after the Civil War (1936-9) –under the Franco Regime illustrates this type of violence, when violence was used to “consolidate victory and the new political order, preventing future opposition and ‘cleanse’ society to secure the new order” (Suhrke, 2012; p. 9). State forces also can apply persistent forms of political persecution and selective political violence in cases where they are considered as ‘losers’ (i.e. Guatemala).

Nevertheless, not all forms of selective state political violence are related to the desire to secure or spoil the new order, but also to facilitate illegal activities with economic motivations. These actions of intimidation could be carried out by state actors alone or in conjunction with illegal groups (i.e. clandestine structures and hidden powers).

b) Political violence from non-state actors

Non-state actors can rely on violence to avoid the implementation of some provisions of the accords or even try to threaten the process in the same way as presented in the case of state-led political violence.

Also, there are forms of violence associated to civil disorder as riots, sabotage, and other forms of disturbance caused by a group of people, as result of massive dissatisfaction due to the results of the negotiated settlements or the implementation of the provisions, or the general conditions of the peace (i.e. economic situation).

c) Violence against social leaders

Selective violence could include persecution, harassment, intimidation, threats, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings of political opponents, activists of human rights, intellectuals, journalists, prosecutors, judges, parties, witnesses, and people involved with criminal trials of abuses committed during the conflict.

These type of violence could have the objective to guarantee impunity in the trial of past abuses of human rights. Social organizations could be targeted as supporters of an armed actor. Selective violence could also involve economic, political, military, or economic elites in conjunction with organized crime groups, developing underground networks, and illegal clandestine structures, that target individuals or organizations for reasons beyond the conflict.

d) Property-related disputes

The lack of guarantees to returnees to have access to their land can generate disputes, even with illegal squatters, state actors, or even with powerful landlords (that could be endorsed by the state). Disputes over land can be a source of violence among communities due to unresolved political and ethnic tensions after the conflict (FAO, 2005: 5). The state failure to avoid illegal occupations and to coordinate the resettlement could generate the eruption of such property-related disputes.

Nevertheless, property-related disputes also can be related with causes beyond the conflict, for example the absence of property registers for rural lands, uneven distribution of the land, and influence of economic elites.

3 Chaudhary and Suhrke (2008) developed a typology of which has been taken as the starting point to establish the list presented here. The typology is also presented in the Global Burden of Armed Violence (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008) and in the Small Arms Survey (2009).
Other disputes among communities are violence during the electoral process, and even mob violence. The return of displaced populations could provide opportunities to seek revenge and to settle old grievances (FAO, 2005: 6). These tensions could be related to the active presence of ex-combatants in communities, who in some cases became social leaders.

e) Violence related extralegal forms of informal justice and policing

In a post conflict context, the failure of transitional governments to provide adequate justice and security will promote the upsurge of extralegal forms of justice and policing (such as lynchings, mob justice, and social cleansing).

As a result the lack of state capacity (both impunity and lack of law enforcement), groups of informal justice and policing exist because they can offer protection and deliver justice, and because the protection of violence and the provision of justice is required. An increase of mob violence after the conflict could also be related to the increase of fear and paranoia, and the routinization of violence after the experience of a violent past.

Informal justice and policing can also be a result of “the sudden imposition of ‘modern’ forms of law enforcement” during the conflict (SAS, 2009: 230), i.e. the replacement of traditional forms of authority, policing, and justice of indigenous communities by military control.

f) Routine state-led violence

After the termination of the conflict, state security agencies can intensify repressive practices without a specific target or political motivation. Such violence might be sanctioned by politicians and government officials but not necessarily explicitly authorized, and is not primarily targeted against particular individuals, or groups for political reasons” (Chaudhary and Suhrke, 2008: p. 3).

Members of state forces that could have been involved in violations of human rights during the conflict could continue working for the police and the army (as a result of impunity and corruption) where extreme repressive practices can be put into the daily accomplishment of their duties.

g) Violence from organized crime groups

The political character of predatory activities of armed groups “may be harder to maintain in a post-conflict scenario and the violence may be purely criminal” (Barakat 2005: 45). Also, groups that remain outside the process, could become in primarily criminal organizations” (Stepanova, 2010: 45). If the DDR programs fail to offer adequate economic opportunities and employment, former combatants can join criminal groups. The development of symbiotic relationships among former political actors and organized crime groups implies the capitalization of the strengths of the both actors (Saab and Taylor, 2009: 458).

From the individual perspective, the membership to an armed group can generate ‘positive’ functions as physical protection to combatants in addition to the economic gains, generating strong ties of solidarity and identity, explaining their longevity even after a conflict termination (Holmqvist, 2005: 49).

h) Interpersonal violence and delinquency (including violence against women)

In the midst of uncontrolled urban growth, associated to rural-urban migration, the state has less capacity to attend to citizens’ needs, including security, justice provision. The combination of a failed DDR and a deteriorated socio-economic is a factor triggering violence. Daily practices and expressions of violence could be a result of individual experience which normalizes petty brutalities and terror at the community level and creates a common sense or ethos of violence (Schepers-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004).

The violence against women is one of the clearest manifestations of the breakdown social norms, also the post-conflict masculinity crisis and high prevalence of single female-headed household, generates one of the most highlighted effects in the aftermath of civil war (Manjoo and McRaith, 2010; IRC, 2012; p.10; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008: 53).

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4 The World Bank Report 2011 show that “the main motivations young people cited for becoming rebels or gang members are very similar—unemployment, idleness, respect, and self-protection, all well ahead of revenge, injustice, or belief in the cause” (World Bank, 2011: 80).
Table 2. Types of post-conflict violence and direct legacies from the conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typologies of post-conflict violence</th>
<th>Factors related to post-conflict violence in a strong sense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-led political violence</td>
<td>- The balance of power resulting from the conflict termination</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The balance of power resulting from the conflict termination</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Massive dissatisfaction on the results of the negotiated settlements or the implementation of the provisions of the accords</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Unresolved political and ethnic tensions after the conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political violence of non-state actors</td>
<td>- Return and resettlement of displaced populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Massive dissatisfaction with the results of the negotiated settlements or the implementation of the provisions of the accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unresolved political and ethnic tensions after the conflict / the absence of reconciliation and reparation to the victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property-related disputes</td>
<td>- Limited or absent DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Availability of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Forced replacement of traditional forms of authority, policing, and justice during the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase of fear and paranoia, and routinization of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unresolved political and ethnic tensions after the conflict / the absence of reconciliation and reparation to the victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence related extra-legal forms of informal justice and policing</td>
<td>- Limited DDR (continuation of state security members’ perpetration of acts of violence during the conflict time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Routinization of violence among state security members, lack of training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Failure of SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine state-led violence</td>
<td>- Limited or absent DDR - Availability of weapons - Culture of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Development of a symbiotic relationships among former political actors and organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence from organized crime groups</td>
<td>- Limited or absent DDR - Availability of weapons - Increase of fear and paranoia, and routinization of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Resettlement of displaced populations in urban areas (rapid and uncontrolled urbanization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal violence</td>
<td>- Absence of reconciliation and reparation to the victims - Post-conflict masculinity crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each post-conflict country can face one, two or all forms of post-conflict violence included here, which will be unevenly distributed across the country. In order to establish the factors that relate these types of violence with the conflict – in a strong or a weak sense, it is necessary to undertake a deep analysis of each post-conflict case. Sub-national exercises are useful to find patterns and contrasts on violence across regions, considering quantitative information on the types of post conflict. The Guatemala case presented latter in this document shows this analysis at the subnational level.

3. Disentangling violence after the conflict: the case of Guatemala

Guatemala is commonly portrayed as one of the countries with the highest increases of violence after the conflict (Restrepo and Tobón, 2011; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011). In fact, homicides have peaked since the Peace Accord in 1996: while in 1996 homicide rate was 21, in 2012 it was around 34. Urban violence and violence from organized crime groups (related to groups of youth violence and drug trafficking related) are the most important types of violence in post-conflict Guatemala, accordingly with the government.

Graph 1. Homicide rate. Guatemala, 1986-2011
Recent studies on contemporary violence in Guatemala have linked post-conflict violence to the previous conflict by the continuity and strengthening of clandestine groups, together with the widespread situation of impunity and corruption left after the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2010 and 2011; Briscoe and Stappers, 2012; Restrepo and Tobón, 2011; McNeish and Rivera, 2012). Nevertheless, these perspectives fail to distinguish the specific linking violence during conflict and its termination, and the inter-regional differences. As a response, the analysis of the Guatemalan case considers both the evolution of violence after the conflict termination and its geographical distribution.5

3.1 The evolution of violence in Guatemala

In Guatemala, political and economic power has been mainly concentrated in the military sector, endorsed by the country’s business sector, landowning elites, and the Church. Only by 1944, a civic-military rebellion implemented multiple liberal reforms. The opposition to this revolutionary government became an anti-government crusade (and an anti-communism crusade) fuelled by the U.S. In June of 1954, an invasion supported by the CIA irrupted in the country, supporting a coup d’état that put in power a right-wing government. By 1960, military uprisings and grassroots organizations set up the roots of the revolutionary movement. In 1962, it was founded the first guerrilla organization, FAR. Latter appeared new groups, PGT, ORPA, and EGP.6

Death squads and clandestine structures flourished during the following decades. Extreme state-led violence specially affected the central and western highlands, mainly populated by indigenous Mayas. Civilian Self-Defence Patrols (PAC) were implemented as key element of the counterinsurgency strategy.

Contra insurgent campaign reduced after Rios Montt fall in 1983. With the return of the democratic order in 1985, state-led violence reduced considerably, but selective repression of the grassroots movements. In 1994 the United Nations Verification Mission (MINUGUA) was created. The signing of the final Peace Accords finally took place in December of 1996.

Figura 2 shows a timeline of some of the main events of the Guatemalan armed conflict. The figure also includes lines as an approached level of violence of the right and left wing.

After 1997, the country experienced a notable reduction in the violations of human rights. Nevertheless, it continued the selective political violence, as the case of the assassination of Monsignor Juan Gerardi. This case is useful to illustrate a general concern after the peace accord, as “it was a manifestation of the resistance among some sectors of the State to revealing the truth regarding the events occurred during the Civil War” (PDH, 1999: 17). Bu 1999 MINUGUA pointed out that how difficult if to distinguish the post-accord illegal security groups and clandestine structures from organized crime organizations (MINUGUA, 1999, paras. 67 and 68).

An important feature of violence in the first years after the accord was the upsurge of extra-legal initiatives of justice and policing, especially lynchings in zones previously affected by the conflict (PDH, 2000: p. 31). By that date, no actors responsible for these killings were identified, although MINUGUA related it to the resurgence paramilitary groups (MINUGUA, 1999, para. 87 and MUNIGUA, 2000, para. 8).

The PDH report of 2008 had the first specific references to massacres and confrontations among groups of drug trafficking in Guatemala. Events of violence in departments as Zacapa, Izabal, Alta Verapáz and Huehuetenango are related with transnational groups as “Los Zetas”, the Gulf Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel (PDH, 2009: pp. 212-214). References to violence related to groups of youth violence also started to be common since 2010 (i.e. PDH, 2010; 42).

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5 The analysis done here includes the qualitative analysis of more than 80 reports on violence in Guatemala after 1997, quantitative analysis of indicators of violence, and interviews of local experts in Guatemala.

6 The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was created in 1982, as an effort to integrate the guerrilla groups.
Figure 2. Timeline historical context in Guatemala until 1996

Trends on conflict victims and homicide in Guatemala

The CEH estimated that more than 200,000 people was killed or disappeared during the Guatemalan Armed Conflict (period 1962-1996). According to the CEH, the most common crime were extrajudicial killings (38%), followed by torture (19%). The army was responsible for 85% of the violations, PACs of 18%, the military commissioners of 11%, and other state forces 4%. Guerrilla groups accounts just for 3% of the cases. The most affected region was the central and western highlands: with the departments Quiché, Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz, Chimaltenango and Baja Verapaz (Map 1). Around 90% of the victims were located in rural areas, and 83.3% were indigenous Maya.

The National Statistical Office (INE) of Guatemala has gathered information on homicides since 1986. Homicide figures portrayed the situation of the departments of the western and central highlands: its homicide rates are usually higher during the conflict than after 1997. Nevertheless, the departments with the highest homicide rates in the period were not severely affected by the armed conflict (Map 2). Even during this period there are other factors promoting violence, especially in the border areas of the southeast (Map 3).

None of the departments registering the highest homicide rates were severely affected by the conflict. This indicates the most violent types that are not directly related with conflict dynamics. This fact implies that the current distribution of violence is not a result of a redistribution of violence after the conflict termination, but a result of deep-rooted factors in those regions of the country.

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[All figures of CEH are based on information of the statistical summary of the Memory of Silence report (CEH, 1999: chapter 2 vol. 2). The REHMI project reported very similar proportions in all variables. See “Guatemala: Never again” (REHMI, 1999: 289-311).

[The proportions of violations of human rights and violence by those responsible can exceed the 100% because a case could be related with one or more actors, mostly in relation with the coordinated action of state forces.

[Although it captures the evolution and distribution of violence since the restoration of the democratic order in 1986, the information doesn’t have a distinction of conflict and non-conflict deaths.]}
Map I. Direct deaths during the Guatemalan Civil War (1962-1997) and presence of guerrilla groups

Data source: Homicide rates by INE. Conflict affected departments, REHMI. Data processed by the author.
Note: Severely affected departments more than 1,000 direct deaths in the whole period, moderately affected between 1,000 and 25, and almost unaffected less than 25.
4. Regionalization of post-conflict violence in Guatemala

As evidenced in the previous chapter, the distribution of violence has remained relatively stable after the peace accord: the highest homicide rates always has been concentrated in the south-east border of the country. Nevertheless, the analysis of a single indicator at the national level is not useful to tackle the changes in the types and distribution of violence after the conflict, requiring a deeper analysis at the subnational level. This exercise aims to identify the direct legacies of the war, factors related to general conditions of the peace, and factors independent of the conflict for each type of violence. A final section summarize these factors by region and type of violence. Table 3 shows the regions defined in this study (also Map 4), including the characteristic of violence before and after 1997.

### Table 3. Regionalization of post-conflict violence in Guatemala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Violence during the conflict</th>
<th>Violence after the conflict termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 3: Southeast</td>
<td>Virtually excluded from the armed conflict. Nevertheless, mercenaries of this region were those who organized in 1954. By 1986-1997 these departments reported very high homicide rates, always over the national average.</td>
<td>It is not possible to identify a type of violence that is specially affecting the departments of this area; however it is reported the existence of ‘culture of honour’ and higher use of arms. All departments in this region reported significant decreases in their homicide rates after 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3: Central region</td>
<td>Moderate number of deaths during the civil war. The capital city hosted many selective assassinations. Guatemala concentrated a big share of total homicides (average of 28%), with homicide rates usually over the national.</td>
<td>Mainly related to urban violence, including economically motivated violence, selective political violence, and violence related to groups of youth violence. The homicide rate peaked after 1999, reaching more than 40 points more than the national average in 2007-2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region1 - Central and western highlands</td>
<td>Departments most affected by the armed conflict. High level of forced recruitment (PACs). Even during the conflict period it registers the lowest homicide rates in the country.</td>
<td>Although it has low homicide rates, this region experiences the highest proportion of homicides related to Lynchings, as land conflict and other communitarian conflicts. Departments with the lowest homicide rates of the country and the most significant reductions in homicide rates after 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2: Southwest</td>
<td>Departments moderately affected by the conflict but with significant presence of insurgent groups (mainly ORPA). Homicide rates around the national average, in exception of Escuintla, with very high figures.</td>
<td>Violence related to the economic activity. Tensions and disputes between peasants and landowners. Economically motivated violence including robberies of vehicles transporting goods, kidnappings, smuggling, and drug trafficking in Quetzaltenango and Escuintla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 5: Northeast</td>
<td>Izabal hosted disputes during several stages of the conflict. In Petén were settled some of the most important insurgent groups, such as the FAR and the EPG. Many massacres took place here. All departments of this region have homicide rates over the national average by 1986-1997.</td>
<td>Violence mostly related to drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Persistent high rates can be related to the existence of the ‘culture of honor’ and higher use of arms. All departments in this region reported significant increase in their homicide rates after 1997.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1 Region I - central and western highlands (Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Quiché, Huehuetenango, Totonicapán, San Marcos, Sololá)

This is the most peaceful region in the country and the one with the highest improvements of safety after the peace accord. Nevertheless, there are high levels of conflicts among communities, which is a clear legacy of the armed conflict. Although there are many factors that could explain these forms of violence, the effect of the replacement of traditional justice systems by militarization, the forced dispossession of lands, the routinization of public violence and the involvement of former combatants in local politics have played an important role in these type of disputes.

This region reports low criminality rates, this is also related with the big population in the departments, generating a statistical effect on this indicator. Also it should be considered the low level of report and the limited coverage of health and security institutions in the region (UNDP Guatemala, 2011; p. 140). Other factor is the high proportion of indigenous population, which have very strong cohesion, generating violence prevention. In Mayan communities the resolution of conflicts “is swift and flexible; its objective is to seek compensation as well as forgiveness, based upon values and moral, and religious principles” (Fernandez, 2004; p. 23).

Populations of this area were considered as sympathizers and supporters of insurgent groups, then the main victims of the conflict. The racist presumption that “due to their immaturity, indigenous people are easily manipulated by the political actions of the guerrillas” (CEH: 1999: number 428) also played a critical role. In fact, homicide rates of Quiché, Baja Verapaz, and Sololá are higher during the conflict than after 1997.

As shown in Graph 2, all departments in the region report lower homicide rates than the national average, and reduction in their rates after 1996. Following the widespread increase of violence in the whole country after 2004, all departments in the region increased their homicide rates, especially Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz and Huehuetenango.

**Graph 2. Homicide rate Region I. 1986-2011**

Data source: INE and National Police. Data processed by the author.
The aspect that has received more attention is the violence related to informal justice and policing (lynching). The information of homicides of the National Police from 1996 to 2011 registers that 60% of all homicides by lynching occur in this region (see map 5): this proportion reached 32.6% in 2000. The region is also affected by conflicts over land, according to the Department of Rural Affairs, 37% of all land disputes were located in the departments of this region.

Map 5. Region 1

Source: National Police (lynchings). Emblematic land conflicts from PDH.

Main types of violence in the region: communitarian conflicts

Lynchings
Lynchings are a specific form of collective violence and take place when a mob, in a spontaneous or premeditated way, executes justice by their own hands (“justicia por mano propia”). Mendoza (2004) indicates that “when high levels of criminality and impunity exists, and such problems disturb a community with strong ethnic identity, it is more likely that this group will achieve collective action in order to provide a valuable public good: security” (p. 8).\textsuperscript{10}

MINUGUA and PDH refer to lynchings as the ‘clearest legacy of civil war’. It is considered that “traditional authority was replaced by military control through Military Commissioners and the PAC. The system based on values, on morals and religion to solve conflicts, was brutally substituted by military force.” (Fernandez, 2004; p. 25).

The conflict also generated long lasting effects that can make a community prone to form extra-legal policing as “the paranoia about the return of mass violence, the routinization of public, exemplary violence during the war; and the local institutional legacy of the civil war, in particular the civil patrol” (Bateson, 2011).

Land and other communitarian conflicts
Land disputes associated to concentration of the property existed before the conflict, in fact, these pressures were among the major causes of the conflict onset. Although the problems of the agrarian sector and to uprooted populations was a central aspect in the process of negotiation with the UNRG the provisions on land tenure conflicts and the implementation of politics of rural development was a failure, as also the implementation of a reform of the justice, police, and military sector. Together with a deterioration of the economic situation, this resulted in increased social conflict and land disputes in the countryside. In some cases the state forces have responded violently to these occupations in complicity with the landlords.

PDH also reported cases of violent disputes related to the electoral process, with cases of “divisiveness among villages” related to political rivalries. In example, disputes related with political power in Nebaj (Quiché) (PDH, 2007; p. 467).

PDH relates the violent confrontations among communities or even members of the same community as a consequence of the armed conflict, as members of different groups that were confronted in the civil war (i.e. ex-PAC and former guerrillas) are now living in the same community, triggering the divisionism and vulnerability to conflicts (PDH, 2009; 115). The characteristics of these events evidence limitations of the reconciliation among parties and reparation to the victims, as part of the

\textsuperscript{10} Other common hypothesis are the high proportions of indigenous populations, high levels of poverty or illiteracy. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that lynchings are part of indigenous customary law (Fernandez, 2004)
negotiations and the peace accords, which have allowed the continuation of rivalries even after the conflict termination.

4.2 Region 2 – Southwest
(Quetzaltenango, Retalhuleu, Suchitepéquez, Escuintla)

The socioeconomic characteristics and the location of the departments of this region make it prone to forms of violence related to the economic activity. From one side, the concentration of agro industry has been a source of different tensions and disputes between peasants, workers, and landowners. On the other side, the concentration of commercial activity, important roads, and the most important ports are related to economically motivated violence including robberies to vehicles transporting goods, kidnappings, smuggling, and drug trafficking. Violence in this region has a limited relationship with the conflict, although most of these come from factors that were prevalent in the region even before the conflict period.

An increase of violations of human rights was reported after 1986, although the authorities indicated that many cases seem to not be related to political issues (PDH, 1993: 66). Escuintla always reported one of the highest numbers and rates of homicide in the country (Graph 3).

This region also reports high rates of disappearances and kidnappings, with increases from 2007 to 2011. Cases of killings with signs of torture has been a concern in the department, even so, the Ombudsman drew attention to the appearance of corpses in various departments of the southwest of the country, mainly in rural farms. The departments of this region are portrayed by Plaza Pública, as the more affected departments by groups of extortionists (Plaza Pública, 2011).

Location and economic activity, factors triggering violence in the southwest

Violence against social leaders

People who seek to expose and make accountable those responsible for wartime violations have continued victimized after the conflict termination. These actions could be related to the desire to keep impunity of acts committed during the conflict. Due to rampant impunity, not possible to distinguish the perpetrators, which can involve members of state security organizations as elites of economic, political, military, or economic power in conjunction with groups of organized crime and clandestine structures (see WOLA, 2003).

Leaders of social organizations that work in the defence of the land and the rights of peasants has been largely targeted. UDEFE GUA reported 127 attacks to small farmers, especially their leaders (from 2000 to 2008). The main types of attack are violent death, harassment, and intimidation (Ramirez, 2009: p. 162). PDH and MINIGUA has documented disputes in the departments of the south coast and Izabal, regions with the biggest agro industrial projects. The persecution of peasant leaders in the south
is a constant since early 80’s, to be considered as guerrilla sympathizers (CEH, 1999; illustrative case N 13).

**Violence related to the economic activity**

Homicides in this region are mainly related with the economic activity (PDH, 2006: p. 345). There are hypothesis indicating that violence in the zone is "due to the economic boom in the region and its geographical position which makes passage of illegal migrants and drug trafficking route" (Prensa Libre, October 10, 2010). Escuintla also experiences a dynamic economic activity, including commerce and agro industry. Its proximity with Guatemala and the location of the main port of the country on the Pacific Ocean, Puerto Quetzal, make it prone to delinquency.

Groups of drug trafficking are moving in the latest years from the northern region to the southern coast due to depletion of recourses in that area, changes in power, as the desire of **The Zetas** to conquer new areas (Siglo XXI, June 6, 2012). This situation fits perfectly with the dynamics of violence.

Beyond the effect of the institutional weakness and the strengthening of clandestine structures and groups of organized crime after the conflict, it is clear that the violence in this region is related to internal dynamics of its economic activity and location. It cannot be denied that former combatants of the conflict period could have joined groups of organized crime; in a context of limited economic opportunities.

**4.3 Region 3 – Southeast (Santa Rosa, Jutiapa and Jalapa)**

Violence in this region is not strongly related to the conflict, as there are cultural and historical which may explain its persistently high homicide rates, even before the conflict termination. Nevertheless, the widespread situation of institutional weakness, impunity, corruption, and the existence of groups of organized crime and higher availability of firearms after the conflict could have triggered the increases of violence after 2004, in the same way as for the other regions in the country. For this reason, this region is a case of post-conflict violence is just in the weak sense.  

This region was virtually excluded from the conflict; REHMI reported only 13 deaths in the whole period. Nevertheless, mercenaries of this region were those who organized in 1954 to overthrow Arbenz to put end to the ‘revolutionary governments’ and its agrarian reform. It is possible that the absence of state repression during the conflict in this region is due to the low proportion of indigenous population, as these where targeted by state and paramilitary forces because they were considered as supporters of insurgents.

The departments of this region always have registered very high homicide rates, even before the conflict termination (Map 1). Jutiapa has the highest proportion of homicides committed in the country (83% for the average of 1996-2011), a proportion that hasn’t been lower than 76%.

Reports of MINUGUA and PDH have multiple references to the existence of a ‘culture of honour’ and higher use of arms in the region. As an indirect indicator of this characteristics, departments of this region have the highest rates of no enforced conscription for the state security forces. MINUGUA also reported from the firearms in the country, that “most of them are in the capital; a large percentage of the others can be found in the eastern part of the country” (MINUGUA, 2000). More research is required to identify the underlying factors of the persistently high levels of violence in the region. The puzzle is bigger when considering that the bordering departments in El Salvador don’t register homicide rates and proportions of use of firearms as high as in Guatemala (Institute of Legal Medicine of El Salvador, 2011).

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11 All factors explaining violence in this region are also applicable to the eastern region of the country, mainly Zacapa and Chiquimula.

12 This region can be portrayed as perfect opposite to region 1 (absence of indigenous population, almost unaffected by the conflict, no lynchings, high proportion of homicides committed by firearm, small populations, and high homicide rates.

13 This aspect was pointed out in different interviews by the Guatemalan researcher, the PDH official and a assistant attorney at the CICIG.
4.4 Region 4 – Centre (Guatemala, Sacatepéquez, and Chimaltenango)

The department of Guatemala is the one with the biggest to the increase on homicides in the country, with common aspects of urban violence. Urban violence is commonly related to the lack of capacity of state institutions as a result of an uncontrolled growth of the population. These factors fall mainly within the conditions of the peace, such as in a situation of economic and political instability. This section is focused on the existence of groups of youth violence and state-led violence taking place in urban contexts.

REHMI reported a moderate number of deaths during the civil war. Right-wing groups pursued “the use of bombs in the central areas of Guatemala City, which contributes to the atmosphere of unrest, and political and social instability” (Monsanto, n.d; p.4). Homicide rates in Guatemala has been always over the national rates, with an increase after 1991 (Graph 5). By 2008, the municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Guatemala concentrated over 30% of national homicides.

Violence in urban settings

Violence in this region here is related to common aspects related to urban violence: groups of organized crime (including groups of youth violence), high level of economically motivated violence (robberies, kidnappings for ransom), and interpersonal violence (i.e. fights, revenges, and domestic violence). Guatemala concentrates 75% of the total robberies of the country (this contrast with the participation in homicides, which is lower than 35%). This indicates that, although there are robberies in other departments if the country.

Many of the forms of violence in Guatemala City are related to the process of uncontrolled urbanization after the conflict termination. No research has been done regarding the role of the influx of displaced populations on urban violence in Guatemala. Nevertheless, this increase in violence can be related with the limited capacity of the city to received and deal with the immediate necessities of the new inhabitants. One of the main limitations is the provision of security and justice.

Graph 5. Homicide rate Region 4. 1986-2011

Data source: National Police. Data processed by the author.

Groups of youth violence

Accordingly to information of the National Police, by 2011 Guatemala City had proportion of homicides related to Maras of 13%, contrasting with a national figure of 6%. Contemporary gangs in Guatemala are the convergence of groups of youth violence that emerged in Guatemala City and groups North America, which were deported to Central America in by mid-80s. By 1997, 53 Maras were identified in Guatemala City as well as in ten departments other than Guatemala (Escobar, 2005; pag. 66, quoted in Cerón, 2011).

Although groups of youth violence play an important role in the current levels of violence in Guatemala, the media
attention that these groups receive can exaggerate the actual occurrence of gang violence. There are "serious doubts about the common perception of maras or youths being the main perpetrators of violence" (Kurtenbach, 2008: 3).

Accordingly to Kurtenbach (2008) there are three factors explaining the transformation of youth violent groups after the conflict: "the dispersion of transnational organized crime, the mostly repressive response of the Guatemalan state and the lack of response from civil society organizations (at least for many years)" (p. 18).

The formation (and continuation) of these groups are related to past and current structural problems of Guatemalan society including lack of employment opportunities and education, inequality, exclusion, and marginalization. Many of these aspects could have been strengthened after the civil war. Additionally, these groups have developed ties with other groups of organized crime and drug trafficking as with clandestine groups in a context of state weakness, allowed by a widespread impunity and corruption of state security forces.

**Routine state-led violence**

The continuation of repressive practices during wartime is a clear consequence of the lack of institutional capacity and accountability. These repressive practices are a reflection of institutional problems, evidenced in police brutality and police militarization. This is a clear reflection of the policies of the past, even before the civil war. Guatemala adopted its Plan Escoba in 2004, “the plan still led police to treat minors as adults and ushered in heightened practices of violent repression, which were soon met with accusations of state-sponsored extra-judicial killings” (Muggah, Rodgers and Stevenson, 2009: 13).

During the conflict period, the Police were involved in many activities of counterinsurgency. As a result of this, the police reform was a critical part of the peace accords; however, “instead of being a model of reform, the police have become a symbol of instability, corruption, impunity and ineptitude” (International Crisis Group, 2010; p. 10).

Additionally to being too small for the problems of violence and criminality, the lack of professionalization and discipline of policemen can have implications in the high level of cases of abuse of force. Also, the effect of the legacy of techniques learned during the civil war cannot be dismissed, many of the former combatants of the state security institutions were made part of the new National Police.

Many of the problems of the National Police came from a limited and improvised reform to the Police. These problems are worsened by the general situation of political instability of the country. More problems come from the widespread impunity and strengthening of relationships with groups of organized crime and clandestine structures, among many other aspects related to the weak conditions of peace in the country.

**4.5 Region 5 - Northeast (Chiquimula, Zacapa, El Progreso, Izabal and Petén)**

These departments had reported the highest homicide rates in the country. The same characteristics were identified by the departments of the western Honduras, also registering the highest rates of its country (IUDPAS-UNAH, 2012). Zacapa and Izabal hosted disputes during several stages of the conflict. Meanwhile, the department of Petén played a major role, as some of the most important insurgent groups were settled here.14

Violence related to DTOs, dominating this region, is largely explained by translational and local dynamics, allowed by a general situation of political instability, impunity, and corruption in the country. Also there are strong legacies related with the involvement of former combatants with transnational groups, and also high availability of weapons remaining from the conflict.

All departments in this region have homicide rates over the national average (Graph 6), and also high proportion of homicides committed by firearm (around 75%).

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14 As indicated previously, the departments of the eastern part of Guatemala are characterized by cultural factors that could explain in part the persistence of high homicide rates, such as the existence of a “culture of honor” and a widespread use of firearms.

15 In this department took place some of the bloodiest massacres as the Dos Erres with 250 killed.
Violence related to drug trafficking

The departments of Zacapa, Izabal, Alta Verapaz, and Huehuetenango where dominated by transnational groups such as “Los Zetas”, the Gulf Cartel, and Sinaloa Cartel, all groups from Mexico (PDH, 2009: pp. 212-214). Confrontations among drug trafficking groups started after Guatemalan trafficker Juancho León was killed in 2008.

The origins of the first organized crime groups can be traced back “to contraband networks dating back to colonial times and the 18th century” (López, 2010; p.4). In the mist of the civil wars in Central America they were strengthened as the routes by the sea in the Caribbean were depleted, giving place to routes by land in the Central American countries.

Drug traffickers also took advantage of the relationships developed with local corrupt authorities as members of state security forces. Since the 70s, the Guatemalan Army developed relationships with groups of organized crime, and local drug barons with the objective to fund the war. These economic resources allowed the self-financing with a balance of licit and illicit activities (Keen, 2003; Youngsters y Rosin 2005).

Additionally to the relationships of these groups with Army members and clandestine groups, it has been reported that “The Zetas”, “have recruited Guatemalan special forces, or kaibiles” (Briscoe and Stappers, 2012; p. 13). This elite group was involved in many massacres during the conflict period. As stated by the CEH report “the Kaibil is a killing machine.” (CEH, 1999; number 42 of conclusions).

4.6 Post-conflict violence in a week and strong sense in Guatemalan regions

A stronger relationship between post-conflict and conflict was found in central and western region, the region with the lowest homicide rates and the more important decreases. In this area, the legacy of the conflict is clear in disputes at the communitarian level, including lynchings, land conflicts and enmities among communities. Although there are many factors explaining these forms of violence, the effect of the replacement of traditional (indigenous)
justice systems by militarization, the forced dispossession of lands, the routinization of public violence and the involvement of former combatants in local politics have played an important role in the disputes among communities.

For other types of violence as all forms of economically motivated violence (prevailing in the south, centre and northern east) there is a level of uncertainty regarding the relationship with the conflict. The way to know the extent of this relation is by distinguishing the level of participation of ex-combatants with current groups of organized crime, as groups of drug trafficking and youth gangs. There is some evidence on the participation of Kaibiles in drug trafficking and the existence of the clandestine structures (WOLA, 2003: 7).

A more clear relationship can be distinguished on state security forces, with legacies related imperfect reform of the police resulting in a lack of discipline and a routinization of violence of police members, generating abuse of force and authority. In the same way, pressures imposed by rural-to-urban migration after the conflict, can be related with the increase of urban violence in the main cities of the country.

Still there are regions where the effect of is unknown, or seems to be very weak, as in the south eastern region. This region exhibits some of the highest homicide rates, which have been high even before the conflict, indicating that there are deep-rooted aspects explaining violence which are not linked with the conflict termination. Nevertheless, the widespread situation of institutional weakness, impunity, corruption, and the existence of groups of organized crime and higher availability of firearms after the conflict could have triggered the increases of violence after 2004, in the same way as for the other regions in the country.

For other types of violence, it was not possible to distinguish a pattern of temporal evolution or geographical distribution, types of violence that seems to be closely related with the conflict. These include social leaders persecution and violence related to state actors. Many direct legacies can be related to these forms of violence as the continuation of the targeting of social organization for their alleged connections with left-wing actors and the participation of former combatants (army and police members and ex paramilitaries) on groups of organized crime. More analysis is required in this aspect, not only for academic purposes but also for clarifying the role of the state, economic elites and clandestine structures as responsible of past and current violence in the country. The lack of information on these forms of violence is related to high levels of impunity in the country.

State security forces have been portrayed as responsible for many forms of violence. They have also been linked to extrajudicial killings, during the conflict and in contemporary times, both as part of operations of “social cleansing”. It has been stated that contemporary Intelligence Structures and Clandestine Security Apparatuses are the continuation of clandestine security apparatuses important during the conflict period, which were not dismantled after the peace accords (including PACs and military commissioners). Also there are many questions and doubts regarding the destination and management of arsenals collected in the disarmament process, which now could be in hands of ex-militants of paramilitary groups or corrupt members of the state forces (IEPADES, 2006).

The following table summarizes the factors related with types of violence by region, as presented in the previous sections.
**Table 4. Factors associated with post-conflict violence by region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of post-conflict violence</th>
<th>Legacies of war</th>
<th>Conditions of peace</th>
<th>Other factors not related with the conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region 1: Central and western highlands</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Violence related extra-legal forms of informal justice and policing (lynchings) | - Traditional justice system replaced by military (PAC)  
- Ex-paramilitaries as instigators and perpetrators of lynchings  
- Paranoia about the return of mass violence  
- The routinization of public violence | - Absence of state institutions, the lack of capacity of justice and security institutions, impunity and corruption  
- Widespread criminality | |
| Land conflict / Other communitarian conflicts | - Forced dispossession of indigenous and communitarian lands during the conflict  
- Displacement  
- Enmities created during the conflict  
- New balances of power  
- Limited reparation of victims and reconciliation | - Failure in the implementation of reforms in the rural sector, justice, police and military sector  
- Absence of state institutions, impunity corruption  
- Deterioration the economic situation  
- Militarization of security | |
| **Region 2: Southwest** | | | |
| Violence against social leaders | - Social organizations targeted for their alleged connections with left-wing actors  
- Desire to keep impunity of acts committed during the conflict | - Absence of state institutions, impunity corruption  
- Strengthen of clandestine groups with possible links with politic and economic elites.  
- Militarization of security (routine state-led violence and private security) | |
| | | | - Interference of business class and elites on national and local politics  
- Concentration of the land  
- Expropriation of communal lands  
- Lack of definition of borders and property rights  
- Interference of business class and elites on national and local politics |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economically motivated violence and delinquency</th>
<th>Region 4: Centre</th>
<th>Region 5: Northeast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Limited or absent DDR</td>
<td>- Absence of state institutions, impunity corruption</td>
<td>- Regional dynamics and regional drug trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Availability of weapons</td>
<td>- Strengthen of clandestine groups and other groups of organized crime</td>
<td>- Local dynamics and reorganization of DTOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Culture of violence</td>
<td>- Deterioration the economic situation, unemployment</td>
<td>- Local organized crime groups, drug barons and families related with drug trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inequality, exclusion and marginalization</td>
<td>- Relationships of DTOs and corrupt state security members existed even during the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Local and contextual factors: level of economic activity, location, migration patterns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Region 4: Centre**

- Maras where formed by mid-80 following an independent dynamic than the conflict (i.e. deportation of members of gangs in United States)

**Routine state-led violence**

- Limited reform of the police
- Lack of discipline, and education in human rights in the new police
- Recruitment of former combatants
- Militarization of the Police

**Drug trafficking**

- Recruitment of Kaibiles
- Limited or absent DDR
- Availability of weapons

- Corruption inside the state security institutions and impunity
- Strengthen of the groups of organized crime and clandestine structures.
- Deterioration the economic situation
5. Conclusions

The topic of violence after the conflict has had a relevant place within political discussions specifically referring to development and security issues related to stability in post-conflict contexts. This analysis is key for prioritizing policy-making decisions and public and international resources in order to implement effective violence reductions and preventive programs in post-conflict settings.

This research concludes that after conflict, violence can manifest through different forms and been related differently to the conflict itself. Interventions aimed to prevent conflict relapse are by consequence different from implementing measures to avoid the reproduction of violence after a negotiated settlement.

When post-conflict violence is only related to conflict risk relapse, traditional peacekeeping operation as “interim stabilization initiatives [that] are undertaken during the sensitive period coinciding with or immediately following the end of armed conflict” (Small Arms Survey, 2009: p. 220) could be enough to maintain stability. Nevertheless, as shown here, violence after the conflict termination can take many other forms than conflict relapse. Then, interventions should address the direct legacies of the war and cannot be limited to maintain stability.

In the same vein, having overcome the risk of conflict relapse, post-conflict violence is related in different ways to the conflict. As presented here, violence can be related to specific legacies of the war (post-conflict violence in a strong way) or to been a result of general conditions of the peace (post-conflict violence in a weak sense). Considering these different levels of relationship, the interventions to prevent violence should be also differentiated.

When some of the legacies are left untended, the risk of reproduction of violence is higher. Alternative approaches to security promotion after the conflict termination should “shift the emphasis away from top–down interventions designed by outsiders to more community-designed and -executed approaches. In certain cases, they include activities that carefully map out and respond to known proximate risk factors and that focus on the motivations and behavioral factors associated with actual and would-be perpetrators” (Small Arms Survey, 2009: 237).

In addition to the legacies of the war, important attention should be devoted to the conditions of peace, which as presented here, play an important role in the continuation of violence after the conflict. Post-conflict measures should be viewed as determinants factors for recovering process where security and justice institutions should be restructured and the economic development should receive a new impetus.

Guatemala case has given evidence, the conditions characteristic the post-conflict context had played a major role in the reproduction of violence after 1997. Guatemalan society is characterized by a political and socioeconomic instability, a legacy of military rule, a historically weak state, and by a lack of government capacity. This results in institutions embedded in impunity and corruption, were the networks of state security institutions and organized crime are latent, and strong and powerful business class remains politically heavily involved at national and local levels. Impunity in the country exists even at the highest levels of political power.

In general terms, these factors explain the contemporary violence in Guatemala. In all cases, all types of violence worsened in all regions after 1997. The legacy of conflict in institutions, communities and individuals was undeniably devastating. Nevertheless, these factors are not useful to understand the sub-national differences on contemporary violence. The direct legacies of the war on contemporary violence in Guatemala cannot me dismissed, including the incomplete implementation of a DDR program, involvement of former combatants in contemporary criminal activities, latent availability of firearms, effects of displacement, increasing fear and paranoia, and a routinization of violence, among others.

Many conclusions can be drawn when considering the substantial increase of homicide rates in the country. The rate has increased steadily between 1999 and 2009, reaching the 35 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Notwithstanding, homicides rates and its geographical distribution are not enough to understand the characteristics of post-conflict violence in Guatemala. In fact, as presented in this document, in the regions with the more important reductions of homicide rates after the
conflict are the regions with more tangible forms of violence rated with the conflict; while in regions with the highest increases of the rates seems to have a weaker relationship with the conflict.

Conclusions on the analysis of the violence on the regions of Guatemala argue that local dynamics play an important role in the reproduction of violence. This aspect fits into Kalyvas (2006) argument of violence in civil war, where “violence on the ground” often seems more related to local issues rather than “master cleavage” driving violence at the national level (p. 364).
References


